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The relation between thinking and truth in philosophy is explored in terms of 
this question: which one serves the other? The essay argues that a conception 









Nietzsche proposed that philosophers aggressively examine truth; that meant studying 
where truths could be located, how they may be formed, what their durability may be, and 
what they might be good for.  Nietzsche’s most commonly cited French readers worked hard 
on these questions, their answers form the core of what we mean when we talk about the New 
Nietzsche or the French Nietzsche.  As the books gathered under these headings have 
continued to attract thoughtful attention, they have also and inevitably stimulated backlashing 
claims that the French labor, if it has not neared its completion, is at least burdened with 
exhaustion or frivolity or both.   
-Renaut and Ferry French Philosophy of the Sixties 
-David Lodge, “The Novel Now” 
-Rosa Montegro  
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 Nietzsche also proposed a very different study, one that works on a separate level; it 
leaves fundamental questions about truth aside by considering the relation between thinking 
and truth.  I believe that this study has become increasingly pressing as Nietzsche’s French 
allies have gained detractors.  In this essay, I sketchily outline what the study is, how it twists 
through deconstruction and Gilles Deleuze, and finally why the question of thinking and truth 
may be important. 
 
The relation between thinking and truth 
The proposal that the relation between thinking and truth be considered can be 
implicitly discerned in an admission that is no small concession for a megalomaniac to the 
Nietzschean degree.  In the fifth book of the Gay Science, Nietzsche concedes that, “even we 
seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, 
from…the faith that God is the truth, that truth is divine.”1  Nietzsche’s admission—which he 
generously applies to his adherents as well as to himself—does not mean that philosophers 
from Nietzsche to Deleuze have been quietly shepherding a secret belief that one day final 
truth will arrive.  It means that Nietzsche and the rest of the godless anti-metaphysicians 
dedicated to hammering away at Platonic hopes for universality have been simultaneously 
maintaining a faith that the reason we think is for truth.  Thinking exists to serve truth and is 
even infatuated with it.  This infatuation is what Nietzsche calls piety.   
Piety is a rule of attraction between thinking and truth.  I use the word attraction 
because piety refuses any dialectical relationship that will ultimately confuse everything in a 
spiral of codependence; piety is a privileging as irreversible as an unrequited love.  Further, 
because it is between, it can assure us that thinking serves truth without making any more 
than the most general commitment about what thinking and truth are.  The discretion allows 
piety’s survival through even the most tumultuous and aggressive philosophic work of the 
last century.  The piety that directed Plato and Hegel survived to guide deconstructors and 
Deleuze.  To put Nietzsche’s point directly, it doesn’t matter whether the truth we are talking 
about is a valiant metaphysical hope or the narrowest perspective of the sharpest postmodern.  
Either way, piety can still be found, either way, thinking can be devoted to truth.   
 
Examples of piety 
If this were a presentation about piety, I would go through and locate scenes of it in 
Plato.  That would mean distinguishing when he wants perfect truth for some practical reason 
like that it infallibly guides the Republic’s philosopher-King’s, from those moments when his 
labors are in the name of truth because of a simple faith that truth is what thinking is for.   
 3 
After repeating this study by distinguishing pragmatism from belief in central 
medieval and Modern philosophers, the next task would be to go through Nietzsche and his 
sympathetic readers looking for their submissions to piety.  This project can begin with a 
general question: Why does thinking go on?  We all know that for Nietzsche’s French 
advocates thinking can no longer stop; we know that Derrida’s last deconstruction will never 
come and that Foucault never finished historically mapping converging social forces and that 
Deleuze foresaw no end to concept production.  What is curious about their situation is that 
thinking goes on interminably for the same reason that for Plato it will one day terminate, 
because thinking is oriented toward truth, because of a deference thinking has for truth.  
Plato’s ultimate truth anesthetizes thinking with revelation.  Postmodern truths aggravate 
thinking with the pressure of differences and the consequent suspicion that no truth can ever 
maintain its integrity because of its formation out of heterogeneous elements.  Whichever it 
is, whether thinking struggles for its own end in stolid being or wrestles unceasingly in a 
world of becoming, what is important for our purposes is what determines the destiny of 
thinking.  Thinking will end one day, or it won’t, by reference to a prior idea about truth.  
This is piety.   
My generalization can be particularized by briefly indicating a specific way that 
Derrida and Deleuze can both be read to sacrifice thinking for truth.  For many of Derrida’s 
promoters, deconstruction means revealing truths as the ironies underwriting philosophic 
arguments.  Each one of these ironies may, even must be undercut in their turn, but that’s not 
the point of deconstruction.  You think deconstructively to locate ironies, you don’t locate 
ironies so that you can go on deconstructing.  This is what Gayatri Spivak means when she 
writes that, “The aspect of deconstructive practice that is best known in the United States is 
its tendency toward infinite regression. The aspect that interests me, however, is the 
recognition within decontsructive practice, of…its disclosure of complicities…”2  Jonathan 
Culler repeats the idea: “if the formulations produced by [deconstructive] analyses are 
themselves open to question because of their involvement with the forces and ruses they 
claim to understand, this acknowledgement of inadequacy is also an opening to criticism, 
analyses and displacement.”3  For both these readers—and others could be added to the list, 
J. Hillis Miller comes to mind—deconstructive thinking is in the name of tenuously gripping 
complicities and ruses.  Thinking is in the name of truth, even if those truths inspire little 
confidence.  Derrida himself is the most slippery case, and I won’t be so rash as to claim it’s 
one way or the other for him, but the piety is there, even if it’s not all that’s there.   
The later Deleuze understood philosophy as the creation of the kind of truths he 
labeled concepts.  A concept, he said, was a knot of experience with irrepressibly loose ends.  
Because the ends can’t all be tied together, every concept is necessarily coming undone and 
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being retied into other combinations.  Thus, the labor of philosophy, the creation of concepts, 
has the effect of constantly requiring more thinking.  But that effect wasn’t the reason 
Deleuze was doing philosophy.  More customarily, he was seeking concepts for practical 
uses: they got him into literature, they let him modify accepted psychology, they helped him 
find political directions.  The interminable coming undone of his own productions was only a 
result of the brand of truth he subscribed to, not the primary desire of his thinking mind. For 
that reason, Deleuze can claim that philosophers are always creating concepts with the only 
constraints being that “these should have a necessity, as well as an unfamiliarity, and they 
[should] have both to the extent that they’re a response to real problems.”4  The unfamiliarity 
(a direct reference to Nietzsche’s Gay Science #355), which is the impossibility of tying all 
the strands of a concept together, results in a guarantee that thinking will go on, that it will 
always go on.  But what it will be wanting along the way is truths cast as the solutions to 
“real problems.”  Sharp renditions of this adoration recur throughout the writings Deleuze 
was involved in.  In Kafka, for example, we want the concept of a minor literature because it 
will help us grip popular, marginal and proletarian literatures.5  In other words, we think in 
order to get a truth, and when we get that one then we’ll go get some more.  Almost 
feverishly, truths are what thinking is about.  Having said this, I note that it would be a rude 
error to configure Deleuze as exclusively a kind of French pragmatist.  Nonetheless, it’s 
difficult to avoid concluding that at least sometimes the reason Deleuze thinks is to get 
concepts that have value in the real (empirical) world.   
What holds deconstructionists and Deleuze together are flashes of the antique belief 
that thinking is for truth, even if those flashes escape from between sentences claiming that 
each truth is only one more in an endless chain or line.  This just repeats what I wrote above: 
the kinds of truths you are interested in—rigidly absolute or factiously perspectival—does 
not effect whether or not you are pious. 
 
Putting thinking before truth: impiety 
Now, what is impiety?  Impiety means that truth is devoted to, and gets its reason for 
existence from thinking.  Nietzsche elicits this idea with the following unorthodox assertion.  
 
"If one were to prove this God of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to 
believe in him."6 
  
There are two iconoclastic and incongruous claims in this sentence.  The first is that 
Nietzsche does not believe in the universal truth God represents; this is the Nietzsche French 
readers concentrated on.  The second claim is where I want to focus.  Why be less likely to 
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believe if God is proven?  Because after the proof, the thinking is done.  And it was the 
thinking, not the hope of God that kept us involved.  In other words, Nietzsche is no longer 
centered on whether or not there is an ultimate truth.  He has moved over to the relation 
between thinking and truth and then impiously oriented truth toward thinking.  Instead of 
articulating fundamental determinations about truth first, and then arranging any subsequent 
thinking around that, he has privileged thinking by evaluating a specific truth in terms of its 
value for his active mind.  Whether God exists or not is losing relevance in the face of the 
more important question as to how God can be employed to generate the most demanding 
kind of philosophic work.  For this reason, Nietzsche is willing to accept the idea of God as 
long as that God remains unproven.  As long as God remains unproven He can fulfill His 
new philosophic responsibility which is not to end thought with the ultimate revelation but to 
spur it with the hope of proving that revelation.   
 If the claim that God exists has more value before its proof, God depends on thinking.  
I don't mean this in the sense that God depends on the quality of thinking that preceded Him, 
if it’s rigorous or disorganized, valid or invalid and so on.  And I don’t mean that God 
depends on the kind of thinking that preceded Him, whether it’s analytic or literary or 
something else.  I mean the fact of thinking adds value to God. Instead of playing a role in 
debates about truth, God is being revered as a philosophic stimulant.  This can be put 
symmetrically: it’s not that we have thinking to reach God, it’s that we have God to advance 
thinking.   
 The pious Nietzsche, who is also the French Nietzsche to an important degree, and 
the impious Nietzsche are irreconcilable.  The pious Nietzsche doesn’t believe in God at all 
simply because he doesn’t accept universal truth.  The impious Nietzsche doesn’t believe in 
the proven God because that bottles up thinking.  But he does believe in a perverted God 
whose value lies in the ability to trigger proving minds.  And if the proof is impossible 
because the God is metaphysical, then we love Him even more.  One of the things that 
impiety paradoxically allows, therefore, is believing in the divine.  Though this doesn’t mean, 
of course, that we believe our own belief.  We only act on it.7   
Another thing that impiety means is a vigorous twisting of deconstruction and 
Deleuze.  For deconstruction, the twisting will occur in the midst of a now old but still more 
than lukewarm debate.  On one side are those who assert that deconstruction, because it 
produces infinite meanings, pushes each of those meanings toward infinite irrelevance and 
therefore the whole theory follows on the route to nihilism.  This argument is repeated in 
cruder form by anyone blithely claiming that deconstruction results in anything meaning 
everything or nothing meaning anything.  These latter criticisms are manifestly misguided 
insofar as they miss the difference between what is infinite and what is unlimited; they can 
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safely be ignored.  Still, the criticism that deconstruction yields infinite meanings and 
therefore that each one tends toward infinite irrelevance, that argument has bite.  On the other 
side of the division we find those authors I have already referred to—Spivak, Culler, Hillis 
Miller—as well as others, who want to rescue deconstruction from bluntly infinite nihilism 
by concentrating on the discreet ironies, the shrewd complicities that signal every 
deconstructive turn.  So, the debate is between the vulgarians of meaninglessness and the 
astute professionals of irony.  The impious come down on the vulgarians’ side; they are 
interested in accelerating deconstruction to the velocity of meaningless truths.  They don’t go 
on from there, though, to conclude that deconstruction is meaningless.  Just the opposite. 
When truth is for thinking, the only thing a truth (a deconstructive irony) can possibly be 
good for is fueling thinking.  And as the value of a truth diminishes, we can at least say that 
its potential to arrest thinking, even momentarily, diminishes with it.  Even better, it 
diminishes infinitely. 
 As that happens, the alliance between the vulgar and the impious begins splintering 
on the question of nihilism.  The infinite meaninglessness of any deconstructive truth, which 
is exactly what the impious venerate, does not consign them to nihilism because the word’s 
meaning has been altered.  Before, it was defined as the practice of debilitating truth, as the 
conviction that a truth hardly matters.  This breed of nihilism takes place within the privilege 
of truth over thinking: when truth is what is important, those who claim that any particular 
truth is endlessly unimportant are nihilists.  But the impious change the premise.  For them, 
thinking is privileged over truth.  Therefore, nihilists are those who suffocate thinking.  
Because even the astutest deconstructor concedes that their best, most insightful and decisive 
ironies are powerless to halt the flow of incongruencies between meaning and text, and 
because those incongruencies always carry the critic forward to the next reading, 
deconstruction, no matter how it’s construed, cannot be nihilistic.8  On the other hand, the 
tradition’s most wholesome figures can be.  Plato and Augustine, for example, become 
exemplary nihilists when they prescribe thought-ending contemplation of universal truth.  In 
their own defense, they can insist on the felicity of the city governed by reference to supreme 
justice, and we might even agree that we’d like to live there, but that just makes the situation 
worse because then not only have they stopped thinking but we have too.   
 The impious reconsideration of philosophy also applies to Deleuze and his writings 
about concepts.  Because he is so often pious, Deleuze dedicated significant energy—and the 
first chapter of What is Philosophy?—to defining this kind of makeshift truth.  The important 
question, however, is not what is a concept, but why create them?  The question squeezes a 
little tighter when you formulate the task Deleuze set with greater accuracy; it’s not just to 
create concepts but to always create new concepts.9  For this, Deleuze offered numerous 
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explanations.  First, there are a few reactive ones he occasionally seemed incapable of 
resisting.  One is that philosophers should create concepts because the ludicrous attempts of 
others drive real thinkers toward fresh ideas.10  There are also two more serious reasons; the 
one I have already cited is a kind of pragmatism.  The reason pragmatism would constantly 
require new concepts is that there will be no end to the need for practical solutions to real 
problems.  Even if we were to stumble upon the perfectly organized society and thus 
momentarily render at least the political philosopher barren of problems to solve, there is no 
reason to believe that social development will naturally stop there.  More likely—even 
necessarily—it will go on and new practical problems will soon be churning out of ceaseless 
cultural and economic transformations.  The reason historical development will necessarily 
go on leads to the more profound reason why Deleuze’s concept production cannot stop.  
Though it gets clouded over in the later writings, the reason is stated transparently in 
Difference and Repetition; it is the book’s guiding hypothesis that the world is founded on 
metaphysical difference.  New concepts are necessary because the world will never stop 
being new on the ontological level.  Doubtless I should elaborate this a little further, but even 
without doing that I can state the following.  Impiety allows us to replace pragmatism and 
metaphysics and the rest with the conviction that we produce concepts as those truths that 
relentlessly come apart and thus demand more thinking precisely because the thinking is 
what we want.  Truths that constantly come unraveled as insistence upon more thinking don’t 
need any justification beyond that fact that their unstable composition results in that 
insistence.   
 Converting Deleuze to impiety means asserting that his concepts don’t serve practical 
purposes and they don’t reflect a fundamental metaphysical condition.  Concepts reflect the 
belief that thinking is more important than truth because they necessitate a return to thinking.  
It follows that a concept is better or worse depending exclusively on how forcefully it shoves 
thinking ahead.  This method of evaluation can be contrasted with Deleuze who continuously 
insisted that a valuable concept be “incomparable”11 with others.  In other words, for 
Deleuze, a truth’s distance from other truths is part of the equation of its worth.  It seems 
obvious that a truth fabricated to be incomparable with others will do quite a bit to stimulate 
thinking, but that’s a long way from saying that a truth will be evaluated solely by reference 
to thinking.  One way to mark that distance is by noting that for the impious it doesn’t matter 
whether a truth is incomparable or a plagiarism of traditional theology.  
 Even though Deleuze despised plagiarism, that doesn’t mean that much of his 
quotidian philosophic activities need to be changed to make him impious.  If we just get rid 
of those appeals to pragmatism, and forgo concerns about whether Deleuze’s motivating 
suspicion—that coherent experience is built from differences—is true or not, then concept 
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production can go on as before relentlessly chasing the unfamiliar, the rarest experiences.  
We only need to avoid justifying concepts on any grounds beyond those provided by 
thinking.  In this way, Deleuzean practice parallels deconstruction.  For both, the conversion 
from piety to impiety changes very little of what philosophers actually do from day-to-day, 
but it does change why they are doing it.12   
Just before starting this brief discussion of deconstruction and Deleuze, I said that the 
idea of impiety will wrench their ideas violently.  In fact, I don’t believe that.  It seems to me 
that the notion of impiety is already there, the pages of the French Nietzsche are even thick 
with it.  I don’t have time today, though, to show why I think that or to support the argument 
with textual references.  I will move immediately to results. 
 
Conclusion 
If postmodernism is the suspicion of metanarratives, than the impious Nietzsche is 
not at all postmodern.  For the impious Nietzsche, a divine metanarrative did not ignite 
suspicion, it stimulated thinking.   
I can generalize this conclusion.  After Nietzsche jeopardized hopes for a final truth 
at the end of history, his French readers have sought to move philosophy ahead with sharp 
interrogations: whose truth are we discussing, how was it made, where will it work and when 
might it fail.  Maybe passing time and loud denunciations have cost this critical practice some 
of its edge, maybe they have contributed to its refinement.  Regardless, they have made space 
for Nietzsche’s proposal that we ask about the relation between thinking and truth.   
The first decision that needs to be made: in which direction does the attraction go?  If 
it goes from thinking to truth, then we know what philosophy should look like, a debate about 
Platonism and its reversal.  First we argue about whether or not truth is universal.  If it is, we 
try to attain it.  If it isn’t, we cut through every experience with postmodern interrogations.  
Leaving that aside, Nietzsche also proposed that we understand truth as attracted to thinking.  
That means devoting ourselves to truths that stimulate thinking.  Nietzsche’s clever example 
was the Christian God who still needs proving.  Belief in the Christian God is better than, 
say, Richard Rorty’s pragmatism because so many of the difficult questions about his 
philosophy are already answered by the label that encloses it.  And even if they weren’t, 
Rorty as well as Deleuze in his pragmatic moments are fabricating defective truths to the 
degree that as a simple practical necessity thinking must halt in order for pragmatic ideas to 
be employed in the real world.  And even if that’s not right, it at least seems that the better a 
pragmatic idea works, the more objectionable it is.  
Much more needs to be said about this, of course, and I’m probably just causing 
trouble for myself by mixing up Rorty with Deleuze, but however that might be it won’t 
 9 
change the following.  Arranging the intellectual hierarchy with respect to a theorist’s ability 
to spur thinking cuts through and sets in motion general philosophical divisions that we have 
grown accustomed to.  Now, Saint Augustine and Nietzsche are no longer adversaries.  Even 
while they tug at each other over trivial concerns like whether there is a God, they work 
together on the more important front of stimulating thinking.  In fact, possibly Augustine’s 
Confessions which passionately recounts the path to beatitude while leaving the proof for the 
reader, possibly this book catalyzes thinking more rapidly than Nietzsche’s philosophy, so, 
by Nietzsche’s own impious reasoning Augustine is superior.  However that may be, impiety 
means that it makes little difference whether truth is a universal representation or a localized 
practice.  What makes a difference is whether truth stimulates thinking.  A universal truth 
may do that well, it may do that poorly.  The same for perspective truths.  
If this is so, then it doesn’t make sense to divide up the history of philosophy in 
truth’s terms as running from Plato to Hegel on one side and from Nietzsche to Deleuze on 
the other.  Instead, philosophers who set thinking in the service of truth should be segregated 
from those who understand truth as serving thinking.   
 
Should we be impious? 
 Should we be impious, why should we be impious?  Several positive reasons can be 
located.  Begin with a straightforward hermeneutic one: impiety lets us explain the irregular 
Nietzschean passage I cited above.  Beyond that, the idea of impiety allows us to revisit a 
number of philosophers we have put at the center of our profession.  I have already begun to 
indicate what I mean.  In the case of Derrida, his philosophy twists into an impious when the 
perilous condition of writing which is its vulnerability to deconstruction is not primarily 
about the production of ironies; it is about making thinking go on.  We have a deconstructive 
reading in order to set in motion the next deconstruction.  What we need to go back to 
Derrida for is to see if he can tell us how to speed the chain.  In the case of Deleuze, impiety 
means understanding his concepts not as having a simultaneous double motion, on the one 
side solving real problems while on the other opening fresh ones.  The solutions need to be 
abandoned, or at least the value of those solutions must be set firmly at zero regardless of 
what non-philosophers may make of them.  What we need to go back to Deleuze for is to 
determine the rules for making truths fall apart productively.  Then we can dedicate ourselves 
to their application. 
 Another reason to consider impiety is because it explains some of what is happening 
in contemporary literary theory.  In his recent and plainly-spoken essay “The Novel Now,” 
David Lodge points out how strange it is that, in his words, “forty years ago a reader of the 
book pages of the London Observer or the New York Times Book Review could pick up a 
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copy of Scrutiny or the Sewanee Review and be able to take an intelligent interest in most of 
what he found in those university-based journals.  If such a reader were to pick up their 
equivalents today—Critical Inquiry, say, or the Oxford Review—he would in all probability 
be totally baffled and bewildered, unable to make any sense at all of what purports to be 
literary criticism.”13  The only thing more baffling, I think, then contemporary literary studies 
is how it came to this, how we got to the point where a leading theorist like Paul de Man can 
write an essay on Proust and when you’re done reading it you’ve haven’t learned the slightest 
thing about what happens in Proust’s novels.  They could be whodunnits or Harlequin 
Romances for all de Man tells you.  It should be obvious from what I’ve said so far that I’m 
not going to advocate a return to New Criticism.  The opposite is more likely.  I will keep my 
own views out of this, however, and simply note that literary theory naturally attracts the 
impious because it is there that truths descend toward minimum value, it is there that they are 
largely freed of ethical and political responsibilities and therefore liberated to devote 
themselves to thinking.  More and more in literary theory, truth is about thinking, about 
stimulating it and pushing it forward, wherever that forward might be.  In this field, it really 
doesn’t matter what’s next as long as it fuels thinking.  At least that’s what Lodge presents as 
his diagnosis of the contemporary situation.  After writing that a typical, educated reader 
would be “unable to make any sense of what purports to be literary criticism,” he adds this: 
“Nor would he find [in literary criticism] much comment on contemporary imaginative 
writing.  Critics these days are too busy keeping up with each other’s work.”  In literary 
theory, truth is almost nothing without thinking.  When separated from thinking, truth’s value 
heads for zero; it’s already so close that critics don’t even bother referring to the creative 
writing their truths are supposed to help us read.   
 A few paragraphs back I said that I wouldn’t have time to evidence my belief that the 
authors we’re studying here write pages laced with impiety.  That’s still true, but I will 
suggest the following; it’s not an accident that Derrida and Deleuze have found so many of 
their most enthusiastic readers in literature departments. 
 There is a further reason to consider impiety, for its suggestion about why we do 
philosophy.  Impiety can explain why we try to work out Kant’s theory of ethical imperatives 
or exercise convoluted postmodern routines.  Start with this: is there anybody in the room 
who, when faced with a difficult moral decision in the real world, seeks guidance from 
Kant’s second Critique?  Or from the Genealogy of Morals?  Or from Derrida or Deleuze?  
When alone in our offices, when the truths don’t matter much, we rush into the most intricate 
and challenging possibilities.  But when the truths do matter, our professional capacities 
frequently get left behind.  Not always, but it happens.  And if they’re left behind, then isn’t it 
really the case that we read and practice philosophy for the thinking?  To put this differently, 
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don’t we look for philosophic truths most fervently when they aren’t good for anything?  If 
so, then shouldn’t we just say that, shouldn’t we just acknowledge that the reason we want 
truths, whether Kantian or Deleuzean or whatever, is to drive our own working minds.   
 This can be put graphically.  When we read a philosophy book, are we always 
sincerely interested in the ideas we find enclosed there; isn’t it the case that what really 
interests us at least sometimes is whether the ideas will let us write our own book?  By this, I 
don’t mean write our own book to get a CV item, though that’s there too, of course.  What I 
mean is that we write our own book and then use that to go on and write again.  In 
philosophy, truths are like books and writing is like thinking, we want the books because they 
accelerate writing.  
 About this acceleration, I suppose we can all agree that truths are like books in this 
way at least: the best ones provoke the most others.  The disagreement would be about 
whether it’s the best ones that provoke the others or the number of others that make one the 
best.  The impious Nietzsche believes the second.  But Nietzsche doesn’t finally tell us 
whether we should be impious.  I’m not sure either, but I am certain that no answer will 
satisfy both those attracted to truth and those attracted to thinking because what is between 
truth and thinking is a non-dialectical allure one uses to control the other; the relation is fixed 
in its imbalance and therefore every justification only repeats the infatuation it means to 
justify.  So, Nietzsche’s question—which do we want more, truth or to think—is not only 
pressing because of increasing and frequently spiteful assaults on postmodernism, but also 
vertiginous because it’s difficult to see where a neutral, sober response might come from.  It 
can be said that the existence of this difficulty does not somehow conceal and therefore 
indicate the path to be taken. 
 
The decision 
 I’m assuming that the decision about impiety is ours to make.  However, the evidence 
indicates the contrary.  Take this conclusion of a letter to the editor published last year in the 
APA proceedings.  It concerns the Association’s collective determination that the death 
penalty is ethically unjustifiable.  “Nonphilosphers, if they have the sense God gave geese, 
will regard our action as irrelevant if they agree with us and ridiculous if they do not.”14  In 
other words, the best we can hope for our truths when left to fend for themselves in the world 
outside thinking is that they be considered irrelevant.   
 Further, if what happens in United States culture spreads pervasively, then 
irrelevance is beyond any doubt the destiny of philosophic truths that want to do more than 
provoke academic minds.  Anyone who reads a variety of the world’s newspapers can’t help 
but be struck by how absent philosophers are from real-life ethical discussions in the U.S.  
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The events in Kosovo, for example, have generated whole sections of transcribed debates 
between writers and philosophers in Spain’s El Pais and Mexico’s La Jornada.  I know of 
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is necessary is to look at the rhetoric Hillis Miller uses.  From there, the conclusion that 
deconstruction is intellectual work that he has done becomes inescapable.  At the very end of 
Ariadne’s Thread, after having performed a number of acrobatic deconstructions, Hillis Miller 
predictably concludes that there is no foreseeable end to this work.  But, he goes on, since reading 
is like being caught in a labyrinth, “I have at least mapped part of the maze.”  [Miller, J. Hillis, 
Ariadne’s Thread (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.) p. 257.  My italic. 
9Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, What is Philosophy, tr. Tomlinson and Burchell (New York: 
Columbia University, 1994), p. 5. 
10 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, What is Philosophy, tr. Tomlinson and Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University, 1994), p. 11. 
11 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, What is Philosophy, tr. Tomlinson and Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University, 1994), p. 31. 
12 The same point could be made with respect to the most traditional philosophers.  A pious 
philosopher and an impious one both trying to prove God will be indistinguishable in terms of 
what they are doing.  They will only be separated on the question of why they are doing it.  
13 Lodge, David, “The Novel Now” in Metafiction ed. Currie (Essex: Longman Group, 1995), pp. 
148-49.  
14 “Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,” Vol. 70, No. 5, May 
1977, p. 168. 
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